# 2AC

## Case

#### Pester clearly flows aff – says both climate change causes conflict AND even if it doesn’t cause extinction we should still try to stop it

Pester 21, Patrick Pester, 8-30-21, PP- writer for Live Science. background in wildlife conservation and has worked with endangered species around the world. holds a master's degree in international journalism from Cardiff University in the U.K. and is finishing second master's degree in biodiversity, evolution and conservation in action at Middlesex University London. "Immersive Reader," Live Science, read://https\_www.livescience.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.livescience.com%2Fclimate-change-humans-extinct.htm // wwu ljh

Could climate change make humans go extinct?¶ A 3D illustration of a woman watching a climate change simulation of Earth.¶ A digital illustration of someone watching a climate change simulation. (Image credit: boscorelli/Shutterstock.com)¶ The impacts of climate change are here with soaring temperatures, stronger hurricanes, intensified floods and a longer and more severe wildfire season. Scientists warn that ignoring climate change will yield "untold suffering" for humanity. But if things are going to get that much worse, could climate change make humans go extinct?¶ Scientists predict a range of devastating scenarios if climate change is not kept under control, but if we just consider the direct impacts, then there's some good news; it's unlikely to cause our mass extinction. ¶ **"There is no evidence of climate change scenarios that would render human beings extinct**," Michael Mann, a distinguished professor of atmospheric science at Penn State and author of "The New Climate War: The Fight to Take Back Our Planet" (PublicAffairs, 2021), told Live Science in an email.¶ However, it's possible that climate change will still threaten the lives of hundreds of millions of people, such as by leading to food and water scarcity, which has the potential to trigger a societal collapse and set the stage for global conflict, research finds. ¶ Too hot to handle?¶ Humans are increasing the amount of greenhouse gases, such as carbon dioxide and methane, in the atmosphere through the burning of fossil fuels and other activities. These gases trap and hold heat from the sun, causing global temperatures to rise and the climate to change much faster than it otherwise would, putting humanity on a dangerous path. ¶ A runaway greenhouse effect is probably the only way climate change impacts could directly cause human extinction, according to Luke Kemp, a research associate at the Centre for the Study of Existential Risk at the University of Cambridge in the United Kingdom. This effect happens when a planet is caught in an unstoppable, positive feedback loop of warming and absorbs more heat than it loses, until the planet's oceans evaporate and it can no longer sustain life. ¶ Fortunately, the runaway greenhouse effect is not a plausible climate change scenario on Earth. For the effect to occur, a planet needs carbon dioxide levels of a couple of thousand parts per million (Earth has a little over 400 parts per million) or a huge release of methane, and there isn't evidence for that at this time, Brian Kahn, a research scientist at NASA’s Jet Propulsion Laboratory, told NASA in 2018. ¶ Venus has the runaway greenhouse effect, but it is much closer to the sun and has a much thicker, carbon dioxide-rich atmosphere that traps more heat than Earth's, Live Science previously reported. The science doesn’t support the notion of runaway warming scenarios, although climate doomists often make such claims, Mann said. "There’s no reason to exaggerate the climate threat. The truth is bad enough, and reason enough to take dramatic action."¶ According to Mann, a global temperature increase of 5.4 degrees Fahrenheit (3 degrees Celsius) or more could lead to a collapse of our societal infrastructure and massive unrest and conflict, which, in turn, could lead to a future that resembles some Hollywood dystopian films. ¶ One way climate change could trigger a societal collapse is by creating food insecurity. Warming the planet has a range of negative impacts on food production, including increasing the water deficit and thereby reducing food harvests, Live Science previously reported. Food production losses can increase human deaths and drive economic loss and socio-political instability, among other factors, that may trigger a breakdown of our institutions and increase the risk of a societal collapse, according to a study published Feb. 21 in the journal Climatic Change. ¶ Related: Has the Earth ever been this hot before?¶ Past extinctions and collapses ¶ Kemp studies previous civilization collapses and the risk of climate change. Extinctions and catastrophes almost always involve multiple factors, he said, but he thinks if humans were to go extinct, climate change would likely be the main culprit. ¶ "If I'm to say, what do I think is the biggest contributor to the potential for human extinction going towards the future? Then climate change, no doubt," Kemp told Live Science. ¶ All of the major mass-extinction events in Earth's history have involved some kind of climatic change, according to Kemp. These events include cooling during the Ordovician-Silurian extinction about 440 million years ago that wiped out 85% of species, and warming during the Triassic-Jurassic extinction about 200 million years ago that killed 80% of species, Live Science previously reported. And more recently, climate change affected the fate of early human relatives. ¶ While Homo sapiens are obviously not extinct, "we do have a track record of other hominid species going extinct, such as Neanderthals," Kemp said. "And in each of these cases, it appears that again, climatic change plays some kind of role." ¶ Scientists don't know why Neanderthals went extinct about 40,000 years ago, but climatic fluctuations seem to have broken their population up into smaller, fragmented groups, and severe changes in temperature affected the plants and animals they relied on for food, according to the Natural History Museum in London. Food loss, driven by climate change, may have also led to a tiny drop in Neanderthal fertility rates, contributing to their extinction, Live Science previously reported.¶ Climate change has also played a role in the collapse of past human civilizations. A 300-year-long drought, for example, contributed to the downfall of ancient Greece about 3,200 years ago. But Neanderthals disappearing and civilizations collapsing do not equal human extinction. After all, humans have survived climate fluctuations in the past and currently live all over the world despite the rise and fall of numerous civilizations. ¶ Homo sapiens have proven themselves to be highly adaptable and able to cope with many different climates, be they hot, cold, dry or wet. We can use resources from many different plants and animals and share those resources, along with information, to help us survive in a changing world, according to the Smithsonian’s National Museum of Natural History.¶ ¶ Today, we live in a global, interconnected civilization, but there's reason to believe our species could survive its collapse. A study published on July 21 in the journal Sustainability identified countries most likely to survive a global societal collapse and maintain their complex way of life. Five island countries, including New Zealand and Ireland, were chosen as they could remain habitable through agriculture, thanks to their relatively cool temperatures, low weather variability and other factors that make them more resilient to climate change. ¶ New Zealand would be expected to hold up the best with other favorable conditions, including a low population, large amounts of good quality agricultural land and reliable, domestic energy. So, even if climate change triggers a global civilization collapse, humans will likely be able to keep going, at least in some areas. ¶

#### The 1ac’s narrative of environmental risk is motivating and drives individual activism

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(Robin- National Foundation Fellow at the Integrative Graduate Education and Research Traineeship, Spring, “Narrating the Environmental Apocalypse: How Imagining the End Facilitates Moral Reasoning Among Environmental Activists” Ethics and the Environment, Vol 17 No 1, ProjectMuse)

Environmental Apocalypticism and Activism As we saw in the introduction, critics often argue that apocalyptic rhetoric induces feelings of hopelessness or fatalism. While it certainly does for some people, in this section I will present evidence that apocalypticism also often goes hand in hand with activism.¶ Some of the strongest evidence of a connection between environmental apocalypticism and activism comes from a national survey that examined whether Americans perceived climate change to be dangerous. As part of his analysis, Anthony Leiserowitz identified several “interpretive communities,” which had consistent demographic characteristics but varied in their levels of risk perception. The group who perceived the risk to be the greatest, which he labeled “alarmists,” described climate change [End Page 5] using apocalyptic language, such as “Bad…bad…bad…like after nuclear war…no vegetation,” “Heat waves, it’s gonna kill the world,” and “Death of the planet” (2005, 1440). Given such language, this would seem to be a reasonable way to operationalize environmental apocalypticism. If such apocalypticism encouraged fatalism, we would expect alarmists to be less likely to have engaged in environmental behavior compared to groups with moderate or low levels of concern. To the contrary, however, Leiserowitz found that alarmists “were significantly more likely to have taken personal action to reduce greenhouse gas emissions” (ibid.) than respondents who perceived climate change to pose less of a threat. Interestingly, while one might expect such radical views to appeal only to a tiny minority, Leiserowitz found that a respectable eleven percent of Americans fell into this group (ibid).¶ Further supporting Leiserowitz’s findings, in a separate national survey conducted in 2008, Maibach, Roser-Renouf, and Leiserowitz found that a group they labeled “the Alarmed” (again, due to their high levels of concern about climate change) “are the segment most engaged in the issue of global warming. They are very convinced it is happening, human-caused, and a serious and urgent threat. The Alarmed are already making changes in their own lives and support an aggressive national response” (2009, 3, emphasis added). This group was far more likely than people with lower levels of concern over climate change to have engaged in consumer activism (by rewarding companies that support action to reduce global warming with their business, for example) or to have contacted elected officials to express their concern. Additionally, the authors found that “[w]hen asked which reason for action was most important to them personally, the Alarmed were most likely to select preventing the destruction of most life on the planet (31%)” (2009, 31)—a finding suggesting that for many in this group it is specifically the desire to avert catastrophe, rather than some other motivation, that encourages pro-environmental behavior. Taken together, these and other studies (cf. Semenza et al. 2008 and DerKarabetia, Stephenson, and Poggi 1996) provide important evidence that many of those who think environmental problems pose a severe threat practice some form of activism, rather than giving way to fatalistic resignation.¶ National surveys give a good overview of the association between apocalypticism and activism among the general public, but they do not [End Page 6] provide sufficient ethnographic detail. To complement this broader picture I now turn to case studies, which provide greater insight into how adherents themselves understand what motivates their environmental behavior.¶ When seeking a subset of environmentalists with apocalyptic beliefs, the radical wing is an obvious place to look. For example, many Earth First!ers believe that the collapse of industrial society is inevitable (Taylor 1994). At the same time, the majority are actively committed to preventing ecological disaster. As Earth First! co-founder Howie Wolke acknowledged, the two are directly connected: “As ecological calamity unravels the living fabric of the Earth, environmental radicalism has become both common and necessary” (1989, 29).3 This logic underlies efforts to preserve wilderness areas, which many radical environmentalists believe will serve as reservoirs of genetic diversity, helping to restore the planet after industrial society collapses (Taylor 1994). In addition to encouraging activism to preserve wilderness, apocalyptic beliefs also motivate practices such as “monkeywrenching,” or ecological sabotage, civil disobedience, and the more conventional “paper monkeywrenching” (lobbying, engaging in public information campaigns to shift legislative priorities, or using lawsuits when these tactics fail). Ultimately, while there are disagreements over what strategies will best achieve their desired goals, for most radical environmentalists, apocalypticism and activism are bound closely together.¶ The connection between belief in impending disaster and environmental activism holds true for Wiccans as well. During fieldwork in the southeastern United States, for example, Shawn Arthur reported meeting “dozens of Wiccans who professed their apocalyptic millenarian beliefs to anyone who expressed interest, yet many others only quietly agreed with them without any further elaboration” (2008, 201). For this group, the coming disaster was understood as divine retribution, the result of an angry Earth Goddess preparing to punish humans for squandering her ecological gifts (Arthur 2008, 203). In light of Gaia’s impending revenge, Arthur found that Wiccans advocated both spiritual and material forms of activism. For example, practices such as Goddess worship, the use of herbal remedies for healing, and awareness of the body and its energies were considered important for initiating a more harmonious relationship with the earth (Arthur 2008, 207). As for material activism, Arthur notes [End Page 7] that the notion of environmental apocalypse played a key role in encouraging pro-environmental behavior:¶ images of immanent [sic] ecological crisis and apocalyptic change often were utilized as motivating factors for developing an environmentally and ecologically conscious worldview; for stressing the importance of working for the Earth through a variety of practices, including environmental activism, garbage collecting, recycling, composting, and religious rituals; for learning sustainable living skills; and for developing a special relationship with the world as a divine entity. (2008, 212)¶ What these studies and my own experiences in the environmentalist milieu4 suggest is that people who make a serious commitment to engaging in environmentally friendly behavior, people who move beyond making superficial changes to making substantial and permanent ones, are quite likely to subscribe to some form of the apocalyptic narrative.¶ All this is not to say that apocalypticism directly or inevitably causes activism, or that believing catastrophe is imminent is the only reason people become activists. However, it is to say that activism and apocalypticism are associated for some people, and that this association is not arbitrary, for there is something uniquely powerful and compelling about the apocalyptic narrative. Plenty of people will hear it and ignore it, or find it implausible, or simply decide that if the situation really is so dire there is nothing they can do to prevent it from continuing to deteriorate. Yet to focus only on the ability of apocalyptic rhetoric to induce apathy, indifference or reactance is to ignore the evidence that it also fuels quite the opposite—grave concern, activism, and sometimes even outrage. It is also to ignore the movement’s history. From Silent Spring (Carson [1962] 2002) to The Limits to Growth (Meadows et al 1972) to The End of Nature (McKibben 1989), apocalyptic arguments have held a prominent place within environmental literature, topping best-seller lists and spreading the message far and wide that protecting the environment should be a societal priority. Thus, while it is not a style of argument that will be effective in convincing everyone to commit to the environmental cause (see Feinberg and Willer 2011), there does appear to be a close relationship between apocalyptic belief and activism among a certain minority. The next section explores the implications of that relationship further. [End Page 8]¶ The Apocalyptic Narrative as a Framework for Moral Deliberation¶ In discussing how apocalypticism functions within the environmental community, it will be helpful to analyze it as a type of narrative. I do so because the domain of narrative includes both the stories that people read and write, as well as those they tell and live by. By using narratives as data, scholars can analyze experiential and textual sources simultaneously (Polkinghorne 1988; Riessman 2000).¶ To analyze environmental apocalypticism as a type of narrative is not to suggest that apocalyptics’ claims about the future are fictional. Rather, it is to highlight that the facts to which environmentalists appeal have been organized with particular goals in mind, goals which have necessarily shaped the selection and presentation of those facts. Compelling environmental writers do not simply list every known fact pertaining to the natural world, but instead select certain findings and place them within a larger interpretive framework. Alone, each fact has little meaning, but when woven into a larger narrative, a message emerges. This process of narrativization is essential if a message is to be persuasive (Killingsworth and Palmer 2000, 197), and has occurred not only in the rapidly expanding genre of environmental nonfiction, but in much scientific writing about the environment as well (Harré, Brockmeier, and Mühlhäusler 1999, 69).¶ What defines narratives as such is their beginning-middle-end structure, their ability to “describe an action that begins, continues over a well-defined period of time, and finally draws to a definite close” (Cronon 1992, 1367). Here I will focus on the last of these elements, the ending, because anything we can learn about how endings function within narratives in general will be applicable to the apocalypse, the most final ending of all.¶ An ending is essential in order for a story to be complete, but there is more to it than this. Endings are also key because they establish a story’s moral, the lesson it is supposed to impart upon the reader. In other words, to know the moral of the story, auditors must know the consequences of the actions depicted therein, so there can be no moral without an ending. To take a simple example, when we hear the story of the shepherd boy who falsely claims that a wolf is attacking his flock of sheep in order to entertain himself at his community’s expense, what makes the lesson clear is that when a wolf does attack his flock, the disenchanted town members refuse to come to his aid. By clearly illustrating how telling lies can have [End Page 9] unpleasant consequences for the perpetrator, the ending reveals the moral that lying is wrong. As Cronon explains, it is “[t]he difference between beginning and end [that] gives us our chance to extract a moral from the rhetorical landscape” (1992, 1370).¶ Endings play a similar role in environmental stories. In Al Gore’s book Earth in the Balance (1992), for example, he devotes over a third of the book’s pages to presenting scientific evidence that disaster is imminent.5 As he sums it up, “Modern industrial civilization…is colliding violently with our planet’s ecological system. The ferocity of its assault on the earth is breathtaking, and the horrific consequences are occurring so quickly as to defy our capacity to recognize them” (1992, 269). He builds this argument so carefully precisely because if the ending does not seem credible, the moral he wants readers to draw from the story will not be compelling. If his readers are not convinced that the ending to this story of ecological misbehavior will be a debacle of colossal proportions, they will not become convinced that they need to dramatically alter their ecological behavior. Thus the vision of future catastrophe that Gore presents provides a crucial vantage point from which the present environmental situation can be understood as the result of a grand moral failure, and Gore’s readers are made aware of their obligations in light of it. Gore himself appreciates the importance of this recognition, arguing that “whether we realize it or not, we are now engaged in an epic battle to right the balance of our earth, and the tide of this battle will turn only when the majority of people in the world become sufficiently aroused by a shared sense of urgent danger to join an all-out effort” (1992, 269, emphasis added). Here, as in so many other stories, the ending must be in place for the moral to become clear.¶ To say that endings are essential in order for stories to have morals is already to hint that stories alter behavior, that they can encourage action in the real world even as they invoke an imaginary one. This much is clear from Earth in the Balance (1992): Gore does not just want people to grasp a moral, to perceive some ethic in the abstract—he wants them change their behavior in the here and now. In constructing a narrative with this goal in mind, he is banking on the ability of powerful stories to motivate social change, to be, as Cronon puts it, “our chief moral compass in the world” (1992, 1375).¶ Mark Johnson’s insightful synthesis of cognitive science and philosophy helps explain further how this process of moral guidance occurs. For [End Page 10] Johnson, narrative is fundamental to our experience of reality, “the most comprehensive means we have for constructing temporal syntheses that bind together and unify our past, present, and future into more or less meaningful patterns” (1993, 174). Narratives are also critical to our ability to reason morally, an activity which Johnson asserts is fundamentally imaginative. In this view, we use stories to imagine ourselves in different scenarios, exploring and evaluating the consequences of different possible actions in order to determine the right one. Moral deliberation is thus¶ …an imaginative exploration of the possibilities for constructive action within a present situation. We have a problem to solve here and now (e.g., ‘What am I to do?’…. ‘How should I treat others?’), and we must try out various possible continuations of our narrative in search of the one that seems best to resolve the indeterminacy of our present situation. (1993, 180)¶ Put another way, what cognitive science has revealed is that from an empirical perspective the process of moral deliberation entails constructing narratives rooted in our unique history and circumstances, rather than applying universal principles (such as Kant’s categorical imperative) to particular cases. That we use narratives to reason morally is not a result of conscious choice but of how human cognition works. That is, insofar as we experience ourselves as temporal beings, a narrative framework is necessary to organize, explain, and ultimately justify the many individual decisions that over time become a life. Formal principles may be useful in unambiguous textbook cases, but in real life “we can almost never decide (reflectively) how to act without considering the ways in which we can continue our narrative construction of our situation” (Johnson 1993, 160). Empirically speaking, “our moral reasoning is situated within our narrative understanding” (Johnson 1993, 180, italics in original).¶ The observation that people use narratives to reason morally may help explain the association between environmental apocalypticism and activism. The function of the apocalyptic narrative may be that it helps adherents determine how to act by providing a storyline from which they can imaginatively sample, enabling them to assess the consequences of their actions. In order to answer the question, “Should I drive or walk to the store?” for example, they can reason, “If I walk, that will reduce my carbon footprint, which will help keep the ice caps from melting, saving humans and other species.” It is their access to this narrative of impending [End Page 11] disaster that makes such reasoning possible, for it provides a simple framework within which people can consider and eventually arrive at some conclusion about their moral obligations.6 More broadly, it can guide entire lives by providing a narrative frame of reference that imbues the individual’s experiences with meaning. For example, it is the context of looming anthropogenic apocalypse which suggests that dedicating one’s life to achieving a healthier relationship with the natural world is a worthwhile endeavor. Absent the apocalypse, choices such as limiting one’s travel to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, becoming vegetarian, working in the environmental sector (often for less compensation), or growing one’s own food could seem to be meaningless sacrifices. Within this context, on the other hand, such choices become essential features of the quest to live a moral life.¶ The apocalyptic narrative is but one of many ways to tell the environmental story, yet it is one that seems particularly well-suited to encouraging pro-environmental behavior. First, the apocalyptic ending discloses certain everyday decisions as moral decisions. Without the narrative context of impending disaster, decisions such as whether to drive or walk to the store would be merely matters of convenience or preference. In the context of potentially disastrous consequences for valued places, people, and organisms, by contrast, such decisions become matters of right and wrong. Second, putting information about the environment into narrative form enables apocalyptics to link complex global environmental processes to their own lives, a perceptual technique Thomashow describes as “bringing the biosphere home” (2002). Developing this skill is essential because without that felt sense of connection to their own lived experience, people are much less likely to become convinced that it is incumbent upon them to act (2002, 2). Finally, the sheer magnitude of the impending disaster increases the feeling of responsibility to make good on one’s moral intuitions. By locating individuals within a drama of ultimate concern, the narrative frames their choices as cosmically important, and this feeling of urgency then helps to convert moral deliberation into action. With this conceptual overview in place, we can now examine more closely what the relationship between apocalypticism and moral reasoning looks like in practice. [End Page 12]

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#### Affirmatives only need to prohibit a pattern of conduct like concentrated power

Lucas 88 – Judge, California Supreme Court

Malcolm Millar Lucas, Cal. ex rel. Van De Kamp v. Texaco, 46 Cal. 3d 1147, Supreme Court of California, October 1988, LexisNexis

\*\* Italics in original.

The statute defines "unfair competition" to mean, as relevant here, "unlawful, unfair or fraudulent *business practice* . . . ." ( Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17200, italics added.) In so doing it effectively requires what the court variously described in the leading case of Barquis v. Merchants Collection Assn. (1972) 7 Cal.3d 94 [101 Cal.Rptr. 745, 496 P.2d 817], as "a 'pattern' . . . of conduct" ( id. at p. 108), "ongoing . . . conduct" ( id. at p. 111), "a pattern of behavior" ( id. at p. 113), and, "a course of conduct" (ibid.).

## K

#### Alt is the same logic as Reaganomics, which says disabled people shouldn’t expect handouts and should just pull themselves up by their bootstraps

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Kriistina Brunila and Päivi Siivonen, “Preoccupied with the self: towards self-responsible, enterprising, flexible and self-centred subjectivity in education,” *Discourse: Studies in the Cultural Politics of Education*, vol. 37, no. 1, pp. 66-67, https://sci-hub.tw/https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/01596306.2014.927721

Adult education as a survival game?

I have had emotional problems and all kinds of problems, but this project has taught me how to survive. (Pasi)

Some time ago I did not know if I would survive but I have learned to get rid of old survival models and to use new ones, better ones. (Teppo)

During their interviews, Pasi and Teppo positioned themselves as students who had become in touch with their real selves, free from previous emotional and psychological chains by becoming survivors. Davies (2005) has argued that the neoliberal discourse has shifted in a significant way towards survival being seen as an individual responsibility. This is a crucial element of the neoliberal order – the removal of dependence on the social combined with the dream of wealth and possessions for each individual who gets it ‘right’. According to Davies, vulnerability is closely tied to individual responsibility. Workers are disposable and there is no obligation on the part of the ‘social fabric’ to take care of the disposed. As well as success, the individual remains responsible for any failure and its negative effects.

Kenneth McLaughlin (2011) has written how political claims today are being increasingly made on the basis of experienced trauma and inherent vulnerability while the previous political demand for recognition has resulted in therapeutic solutions. In his view, the survival discourse is a consequence of the therapeutic ethos (McLaughlin, 2011). Moreover, in several educational programmes the discourse of survival is already central (Brunila, 2014) in the way that the therapeutic discourse of vulnerabilities and emotional problems is able to find a powerful expression in the position of the victim, and the solution is to become a survivor.

In the therapeutic and enterprising discourses above, students such as Pasi and Teppo comply with such demands in order to be recognised as ‘properly’ flexible, active, self-disciplined and responsible. The ideal subjectivity is built on ideas of what is desirable, what is possible, and how to be heard. These extracts describe how young adults’ existence is shaped, and how as a consequence they begin to position themselves as survivors (see, also, Brunila, 2014; McLaughlin, 2011). The position of a survivor appears to be seductive. The survivor concept allows for a flattering representation of the emotional self, for it suggests that despite intense pain and suffering, these individuals have survived. This makes survivor status all the more authoritative and remarkable, as Furedi (2004) has written. The problem here is that in order to be heard, the young person must play the role of a victim. The position from which people are heard is established through recognising their vulnerabilities, injuries and emotional problems including low self-esteem, anxiety and stress. The assumed identity is one of victimhood or traumatisation; it is the therapeutic identity required for recognition (see, also, McLaughlin, 2011). This risks depoliticising the problems people face in society such as unemployment, lack of education and poverty.

Conclusion

We have argued that therapisation including both the therapeutic and enterprising discourses is effective in linking political rhetoric and regulatory programmes to the ‘selfsteering’ capacities of the subjects themselves (cf. Rose, 1998). The removal of dependence on the social is combined with the dream of empowerment, wealth and possessions for anyone who gets it ‘right’. However, instead of autonomous and rational individuals, what therapisation actually produces is vulnerable and fragile as well as imperfect and incapable subjectivities. When vulnerability is tied to individual responsibility, there is no obligation on the part of the ‘social fabric’ to take care of the disposed. Failure as well as success is up to each individual to bear.

In an era of individualisation and the decline of wider collective identities (Furedi, 2004), people are forced to rely on their own resources. Understanding one’s self becomes crucial. The vocabulary of both enterprising and therapeutic discourses offers a means to self-discovery. The ideal therapeutic discourses offer to free each of us from our psychic and emotional chains so that we can become enterprising and take control of ourselves and our lives. In practice, the result seems to be a ‘vicious circle’ where the individual is constantly obliged to improve his/her ever fragile and vulnerable self in perpetual competition with others. The risk of not achieving what is expected is therefore ever present. This shows how choice stems from the condition of possibility.

#### ONLY the aff has a sustainable strategy of countering concentrated power – anarchism’s refusal to engage with the state ensures their revolution gets crushed

**Wainer and Bienenfeld 19** – Kit Wainer is a member of the United Federation of Teachers and is active in the opposition caucus, the Movement of Rank and File Educators. Mel Bienenfeld is a longtime socialist activist and recently retired president of a higher-education teachers local union.

(Kate Griffiths, 7-21-2019, "Problems with an Electoral Road to Socialism in the United States," New Politics, https://newpol.org/issue\_post/problems-with-an-electoral-road-to-socialism-in-the-united-states/)

Governors control the National Guard and state police. Local governments control local police forces, although the Constitution allows states full discretion to limit the autonomy of localities. While the president may federalize the guard for a period of time, it is easy to imagine guard generals refusing to obey presidential authority when asked to enforce decisions the courts have ruled unconstitutional. Of course a president can send the army into states, thus violating the Posse Comitatus Act of 1878, but it is similarly easy to envision generals refusing to execute orders on solid constitutional grounds, or the officer corps dividing amongst itself, in that scenario. In short there would be no way of overcoming state recalcitrance to implement socialist legislation without destroying the legitimacy of the constitutional order.

In fact, not only can state authorities resist, they can also repress. Partial socialist victories in the electoral arena would inevitably yield a fractured state, with critical parts still in the hands of pro-capitalist officials. The latter would be constitutionally authorized to arrest and terrorize mass movement activists who threaten their rule. They have, after all, done so numerous times in U.S. history. Even today, federal and state authorities are far more likely to arrest someone for the crime of being an immigrant or person of color than for marching with an armed fascist gang threatening the annihilation of the Jews. Mass movements that are not prepared to physically confront and defeat armed authorities would stand little chance.

Bureaucracy, the Regulatory Process, and Unelected Authority

While the legislative and executive branches make law and the judicial branch reviews laws, unelected regulatory bodies determine how they are actually interpreted and implemented. Currently, these bodies are staffed by skilled bureaucrats through a combination of patronage, political favoritism, and civil service promotion. Regulatory agencies are typically staffed by and managed by the industries they are designed to regulate. Even lower-level bureaucratic posts often enable employees to audition for far more lucrative private-sector employment. This creates enormous incentives to defer to corporate prerogative, even if the elected authorities have a different agenda. And these regulatory agencies decide what the law means in day-to-day situations that lawmakers can never predict when writing bills.

Bureaucratic and regulatory agencies govern at the local, state, and federal levels. They set zoning policies that largely determine whether housing is affordable and safe for working-class habitation. Their rules indirectly affect how much of their lives working people spend commuting to and from work because where tall buildings are built often determines which neighborhoods are clogged with traffic. As with regulatory agencies, building departments are typically instruments of real estate developers, even if they do protect occupants’ safety to some extent. Unelected bodies, such as public authorities in New York and New Jersey, typically control public transportation and critical infrastructure, and an army of bureaucrats runs the education systems all over the United States. All of these bureaucratic agencies are susceptible to intense pressure from highly paid lobbyists. Conditions of housing, transportation, public health, and education are some of the most powerful forces shaping workers’ daily lives, and it is difficult to imagine how working people would maintain confidence in and enthusiasm for a workers’ government that could not demonstrably improve those aspects of their lives. It is also difficult to see how a government could make significant headway in those areas without breaking apart the relevant bureaucracies and busting up the private-sector lobbying firms that influence them. In short, the very precondition for sustained radical electoral success would require the demolition of most regulatory organizations and their replacement with democratic and accountable bodies.

Unelected bureaucracy also reigns in the area of foreign policy. While major decisions such as going to or avoiding war, or negotiating trade agreements, are in the hands of elected officials, many of the day-to-day details of foreign relations are decided and implemented by career officials who are similarly subjected to substantial corporate lobbying and use foreign service careers as springboards into highly paid private-sector employment. The State Department routinely approves international trade licenses, contacts foreign bureaucrats on behalf of U.S. firms, and utilizes personal relationships with international counterparts to smooth those processes. In a world in which several major capitalist states still rule and the U.S. state is fractured, these bureaucrats could become key links between global and domestic counter-revolution.

While bureaucracy takes different forms in different countries, career civil servants staff the state apparatus in most capitalist states today. They tend to be ideologically committed to the survival of the state. Their career ambitions also depend on the patronage of higher ups in each department and alliances with private capitalists who hold the key to their promotion both inside and outside the public sector.

Can bureaucracy be subordinated to a workers’ government? Yes. In fact the soviet state had no choice but to rely on sectors of the tsarist bureaucracy both to win the civil war and for government administration in the 1920s. In a scenario in which the capitalist class has been fully defeated, disempowered bureaucrats might well decide, one by one, that cooperation with the new workers’ regime represents the only hope for maintaining their careers. However, the “democratic,” or, more accurately, the electoral, road to socialism leads inevitably along a different path. It does not deliver a sudden, decisive defeat to the state or to the ruling class. Quite the contrary, it leads to what might be termed “dual power,” in which socialists rule over substantial sectors of the government but capitalist politicians dominate others and much of the capitalist state bureaucracy remains intact. The police, fearing that their careers are in jeopardy, would likely continue to repress mass movements and fight at all costs to preserve their positions. These institutions of the capitalist state would also have powerful allies in the judiciary, not to mention support from capitalists around the world. Under that scenario it is highly unlikely that the administrative bureaucracies would place themselves at the service of workers’ regimes who have far less to offer them and from whom they have far less to fear.

Throughout U.S. history the labor movement and other radical reform movements have had to contend with ferocious and violent counterattacks. After World War I, socialists, anarchists, and labor activists of various stripes faced intense state repression. The survival of U.S. capitalism was not in question at this time. Yet, the federal government responded with mass arrests, deportations, frame-ups, and violence. After World War II, federal and state governments effectively repressed the radical wings of the labor movement with witch hunts and blacklists, while tolerating rampant racist violence. It is important to note that the Communist Party not only, at this point, could not have threatened revolution, its orientation was heavily electoral. But the mere prospect of a more militant labor movement and a radical electoral alternative was something both Democrats and Republicans were determined to repress. In the 1960s the FBI’s Cointelpro program targeted movement activists and even murdered Black Panther leader Fred Hampton.

A workers movement in the United States must prepare for severe state repression or it will succumb to it. At times this may involve operating clandestinely. It may also require active self-defense against legal authorities or fascist paramilitaries. Most importantly, preparation means educating a generation of socialist and labor activists about how and why the state protects capitalist profitability both through its own constitutional mechanisms and often with repressive measures that violate its own legality.

#### Responding to domination requires that we commit ourselves to producing a liberatory vision of the social fabric – accepting in advance the futility of our actions shuts down revolutionary potential

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Aziz Rana, “Freedom Struggles and the Limits of Constitutional Continuity,” *Maryland Law Review*, vol. 71, no. 4, 2012, pp. 1046-1051, https://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2493&context=facpub.

More relevantly for the American case, the story of Thaddeus Stevens and David Davis indicates that progressive orientations to constitutional faith should be assessed pragmatically. Not only has the constitution-in-practice been riddled with injustice, as Balkin eloquently illuminates, the Constitution’s discursive structures have not been an unalloyed blessing for the freedom struggles of the past. Indeed, there is no reason to believe that although the radical potential of previous movements may have been hindered – at the most crucial moments – by the focus on constitutional narrative, similar fates will not befall future efforts. If the goal of progressives is a transformative and ultimately political one, faith should reside in the ideal of effective and equal freedom alone; this preeminent commitment may require both a politics of constitutional construction as well as one of constitutional rupture (the latter through democratic discretion). In a sense, progressive political faith should view its relationship to traditions, including constitutional ones, strategically – to be asserted when it serves emancipatory purposes and questioned or even rejected when it does not.

Such a call for progressives to be less tradition-bound and more willing to embrace constituent power (not to mention its very real political dangers) comes with a final note of caution. Twentieth century projects of redemption, both revolutionary anti-colonial ones and those grounded in constitutional faith, have all participated in a particular type of emancipatory history. As theorist David Scott writes, these redemptive accounts embrace a narrative structure of “romance.”77 They have presented “narratives of overcoming, often narratives of vindication; they have tended to enact a distinctive rhythm and pacing, a distinctive direction, and to tell stories of salvation.”78 Above all they have posited a future in which individuals can transcend oppression and unshackle freedom from existing modes of subordination – once and for all. Yet, the contemporary moment, both in the U.S. and in the postcolonial world writ large, has been marked by far greater historical complication. Post-apartheid South Africa offers just one telling illustration. The South African struggle embodied a classic story of anti-colonial redemption, complete with a revolutionary re-founding and a fundamental constitutional rupture. Yet, the postcolonial present in South Africa is much more equivocal than straightforwardly redemptive. Although constitutionally premised on racial equality, the country remains riddled with extreme economic hierarchies that are the persistent legacy of apartheid. In a sense, even total revolution and explicit constitutional rejection has not assured a future of salvation. Similarly, here in the U.S., the twentieth century’s great redemptive social movements – on behalf of organized labor, civil rights, and women’s equality – have transformed the political terrain but have also either receded in social power or left us with complex presents, marked by the overlap between formal equalities and substantive injustices. As Scott suggests, the twentieth century romance of redemption and untainted emancipation is now in many ways “a superseded future, one of our futures past.”79

The response among progressive should not be to give up generally on a utopian imagination. But it does suggest the value of binding this imagination to historical narratives of tragedy rather than to those of redemption or romance. By tragedy, I do not mean the notion that “due to some flaw or defect” our political and constitutional frameworks will necessarily commit us to “a disastrous course of action,” one that produces “great suffering and severe punishment.”80 Instead, I mean the idea, certainly embedded in the concept of a tragic flaw, that historical moments are marked by linked and mutually constitutive relationships of freedom and subordination. In describing the tragic in the postcolonial predicament, Scott writes:

[T]ragedy sets before us the image of a man or woman obliged to act in a world in which values are unstable and ambiguous. . . . [F]or tragedy the relation between past, present, and future is . . . a broken series of paradoxes and reversals in which human action is ever open to unaccountable contingencies – and luck.81

Thus, every political period, be it the Civil War, Reconstruction, or the current-day, presents its own hierarchies and dependencies. The goal of progressive action is to uncover those forms of dependence and to strive for liberation from them. But even successful projects of emancipation will produce their own “unaccountable contingencies” and generate new legal and political orders that knit together secured freedoms with emerging hierarchies, as post-apartheid South Africa and contemporary America suggest. This is the paradox of tragedy. It offers a narrative in which the struggle for emancipation is a ceaseless one, requiring an aspiration to utopia but never capable of being completely redeemed in history – as total emancipation is always and permanently beyond reach.

Besides speaking to the complexity of our postcolonial and post-civil rights times, such a narrative of tragedy better addresses the current moment in two ways. First, unlike stories of redemption, it provides a greater bulwark against the inclination to rationalize the injustices of the present, especially by acceding to a Whiggish faith in progress. Redemption stories, as Balkin himself recognizes and critiques,82 have the tendency to read history as a long-term trend toward justice, albeit halting and uneven. At a time when old forms of subordination persist in the U.S. and yet we see sustained backsliding from the very achievements of previous eras, a tragic narrative frontally challenges the complacent willingness to believe that conditions are ‘good enough.’ It does so by reminding us to be on continuous guard against the hidden and unwitting forms of domination embedded in our social practices, even in those practices – like constitutional construction and veneration – that we collectively esteem.

Second, and finally, an adequately tragic sensibility helps progressives to reclaim a space in their political imagination for democratic discretion. The grave problem of past revolutionary agendas (anti-colonial or otherwise) was a failure to appreciate fully the destructive violence generated by radical change. But if constitutional rupture must still be part of the progressive toolkit, an awareness of the tragic has the potential to cabin the worst consequences of discretion. Tragic discourse, by emphasizing the ambiguous nature of any transformative project, suggests its own ethic of political responsibility. Such a narrative makes ever-present the potential costs wrought by legal rupture and compels progressive actors to appreciate the political stakes when breaking from constitutional fidelity. A tragic sensibility demands of progressives both that they aggressively assert emancipatory commitments and that they embrace a judicious political ethics. Ultimately, it imagines an orientation to collective life animated by justice but tempered by the recognition of indissoluble paradox.

#### Trying to make the world better isn’t ableist – rejecting concrete improvements to the world because of potential ableism is self-defeating

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(“Moral wrongs, disadvantages, and disability: a critique of critical disability studies,” Disability & Society Volume 29, Issue 4, 2014)

The ideas developed within CDS draw heavily on concepts developed in other areas of difference including ethnicity, sexuality and gender. Whilst it is not simply about conflating different approaches together with that of disability studies, the case for similarities are readily made (Shildrick 2012). McCruer (2010), for example, drawing on the ideas of Judith Butler juxtaposes compulsory heterosexuality with compulsory ablebodiedness, arguing that privileging heterosexuality and ablebodiedness acts to the detriment of others**. The argument is that by disrupting the categories disabled/non-disabled, the discrimination experienced by disabled people can be challenged.**

This attempt at what Sayer (2011) has called normative disorientation found in **much of the theorizing around ableism creates problems.** For example, how can we discuss or debate prevention when a feature of ableism is described as a ‘belief that impairment (irrespective of “type**”) is inherently negative** which should, if the opportunity presents itself, be ameliorated, cured or indeed eliminated’ (Campbell 2009b, 23)? Is the promotion of the use of folic acid before and during pregnancy based on an anti-disablist or perhaps ableist viewpoint; and if so, should CDS be campaigning against those who seek to promote these views? This gap is acknowledged by Meekosha (2011), but it has not been examined or unpacked. Whilst we may be accused here of constructing a ‘straw person argument’ it is consistent with Campbell’s claim.

This challenge to normativity, of what is good or bad, or right or wrong, characterizes much of the CDS literature. Whilst CDS often makes normative judgements about policies **or about the current understanding of disability** or how contemporary social organization is morally wrong, it offers no evaluative arguments on impairments or on the implications of living with an impairment. Shildrick (2012, 40), for example, has argued that ‘all bodies are unstable and vulnerable’ and that there is ‘no single acceptable mode of embodiment’. Shildrick attempts a move to an ethical realm by posing what she describes as ‘an **important ethical question**: **how can we engage with morphological difference** that is not reducible to the binary of either sameness or difference?’ And, in line with this rather leading question, she continues: ‘If we are to have an ethically responsible encounter with corporeal difference, then, we need a strategy of queering the norms of embodiment, a commitment to deconstruct the apparent stability of distinct and bounded categories’ (Shildrick 2012, 40). In Shildrick’s view, any strategy, political arrangement, or ethical conceptualization that is based on a group identity built upon a binary distinction or difference, is ethically wrong. This is an interesting suggestion but unfortunately Shildrick does not provide any ethical argument to support it or a practical example of how it may be enacted.

It is, as Shildrick argues, safe to suggest that there is no ‘single acceptable mode of embodiment’, but at the same time **it seems equally safe to suggest that there are a lot of people who would argue that some forms of embodiment are preferential to others**. **Seeing impairments as** acceptable forms of human diversity **is not the same as seeing them as neutral or insignificant**. When people say that some forms of embodiment are preferential to others, they are ultimately referring to ideas about human well-being. In other words, one reason why people generally prefer not to have impairments is ethical; they believe that some impairments may in and of themselves prevent people from acting and moving as they wish, from doing valued activities, or faring well in general. Thomas (1999) coined the term ‘impairment effects’ to define these limitations and to separate them from those that arise from disablement. CDS is normative as well, albeit its normative focus is on social factors instead of individuals’ abilities. CDS, like the social model, contains a strong normative dimension that implies what is right or wrong as regards social arrangements, but neither model takes a clear normative approach to the lived, embodied and visceral experiences of having an impairment (Vehmas 2004).

**Human beings are** dialogical beings **and the significance of disability or impairment and their impact on well-being will tend to be comparative**. As Sayer argues: ‘we measure ourselves not so much against absolute standards but against what others are like, particularly those with whom we associate the most’ (2011, 122). **Evaluative judgements** in relation to the individual experience of both disability and impairment are important. If we are to properly understand social phenomena, such as disability, we have to **recognize their normative dimensions and the values attached to them**. **Value-laden statements**, as Sayer (2011) argues, **can strengthen the descriptive adequacy of accounts**. Sayer demonstrates this by using the example of the Holocaust. This, he says, can be represented in two ways: ‘thousands died in the Nazi concentration camps’ and ‘thousands were systematically exterminated in the Nazi concentration camps’. The latter sentence is not only more value-laden than the first, but more accurate as well (Sayer 2011, 45). We would argue that **talking about ableism,** disablism or oppression does not make sense **without reference to normative judgements** about people’s well-being, as without such a discussion only a partial picture will emerge. The same may also apply to judgements about fair social arrangements.

CDS does not engage with ethical issues to do with the role of impairment and disability in people’s well-being and the **pragmatic and mundane issues** of day-to-day living. Imagine, for example, a pregnant woman who has agreed, possibly with very little thought, to the routine of prenatal diagnostics, and who has been informed that the foetus she is carrying has Tay-Sachs disease. She now has to make the decision over whether to terminate the pregnancy or carry it to term. The value judgements that surround Tay-Sachs include the fact that it will cause pain and suffering to the child and he or she will probably die before the age of four. These are morally relevant considerations to the mother. Whilst CDS would probably guide her to confront ableist assumptions and challenge her beliefs about the condition, **considerations having to do with pain and suffering are nevertheless** morally significant**.** The way people see things, and the language that is used to describe certain conditions, can affect how they react to them, but freeing oneself from ableist assumptions may not in some cases be enough. **There may be** insurmountable realities **attached to some impairments** where parents feel that their personal and social circumstances would not enable them to provide the child or themselves with a satisfactory life (Vehmas 2003).

Impairment sometimes produces practical, difficult ethical choices **and we need more concrete viewpoints than the ideas provided through ableism,** which offers very little practical moral guidance. It is questionable whether the notion of ableism would help the parents in deciding whether to have a child who has a degenerative condition that results in early death. Campbell (2009a, 39, 149 and 159), for example, discusses arguments about impairments as harmful conditions, the ethics of external bodily transplants as well as wrongful birth and life court cases (whether life with an impairment is preferable to non-existence), and how ableism impacts on discourse around these issues. Whilst her analysis of such ableist discourses suggests ethical judgements, she provides no arguments or conclusions as to whether, for example, external bodily transplants are ethically wrong or whether impairment may or may not constitute a moral harm.

Under the anti-dualistic stance adopted by CDS, even the well-being/ill-being dualism becomes an arbitrary and nonsensical construct. Under ableism it can be constructed as merely maintaining the dominance of those seemingly faring well (supposedly, ‘non-disabled’ people), and labels those faring less well as having lesser value.

There may not be a clear answer to what constitutes human well-being or flourishing, **but in general we can and we need to agree about some necessary elements required for well-being.** Also, as moral agents we have an obligation to make judgements about people’s well-being and act in ways that their well-being is enhanced (Eshleman 2009). This is why we have, for example, coronary heart disease prevention programmes **because the possible death or associated health problems are seen as harms.** Possibly these policies are based on ableist perspective, but if that is the case then the normative use of ableism is null; **eradicating supposedly ableist enterprises such as coronary heart disease prevention would be an example of** reductio ad absurdum. **Denying some aspects of well-being are so clear that their denial would be** absurd**, and simply morally wrong.**

CDS raises ethical issues and insinuates normative judgements **but does not provide supporting ethical arguments. This is a way of** shirking **from intellectual and ethical responsibility** to provide sound arguments and conceptual tools for ethical decision-making that would benefit disabled people. If we are to describe disability, disablism, and oppression properly, we have to explicate the moral and political wrong related to these phenomena. Whilst CDS has produced useful analyses, for example, of the cultural reproduction of disability, it needs to engage more closely with the evaluative issues inherently related to disability. As Sayer has argued (against Foucault):

while one could hardly disagree that we should seek to uncover the hidden and unconsidered ideas on which practices are based, **I would argue that critique is indeed exactly about identifying what things ‘are not right as they are’, and why**. (Sayer 2011, 244)

By settling almost exclusively to analyses of ableism without engaging properly with the ethical issues involved, CDS analyses are deficient. The moral wrongs related to disablism or ableism are matters of great concern to disabled people, and CDS should in its own part take the responsibility of remedying current wrongs disabled people suffer from.

#### Aff solves colonial extraction – commitment to anti-domination requires anti-imperialism

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The Era of Anti-Capitalism and Anti-Imperialism

Again, this was not always the case. Elements of the early twentieth century labor movement, especially those associated with the Socialist Party and that gravitated to the Industrial Workers of the World (IWW), were famous for their avowed anti-nationalism. A common slogan among such activists was that, “The working class has no country. The employing class has stolen them all.”3 This hostility to nationalism and to invocations of patriotic attachment were not just radical poses. They were grounded concretely in an account of the oppressive forces facing working people and the modes both of solidarity and of reform that would be needed to overcome them. According to party and union members, the driving problem of the era was plutocracy—the overwhelming authority corporations and socioeconomic elites wielded over political life. Moreover, given the international rise of corporate capitalism, what defined this plutocracy was the extent to which corporate elites benefited from the mobility of capital and from their ties to the American state. As the United States became a growing world power, policymakers made replicating business-friendly market structures and state institutions their paramount objective. This entailed opening new markets for American domestic goods and intervening, in many cases violently, wherever foreign opposition threatened an American-defined stability. U.S. supervision and oversight, often justified in explicitly racial terms, became the essential gateway for the expansion of a new global economy and the entrenchment of pliable foreign elites. What all of this underscored for socialists and labor radicals was the degree to which plutocracy was global in nature and required a global response. As Christian socialist William Brown commented, “Plutocracy is not a national affair. It is international. It is rapidly becoming the government of the world. . . . The interests of wealth decide the final policies of all civilized nations.”4

According to those in the IWW, for working people to contest these developments, they would need a new account of solidarity. Poor farmers and industrial workers had to recognize that a small group of fellow nationals, their employers, and those government officials closely aligned with them were the public’s principal opponents. They had to break free from class deference and to develop a fully oppositional political culture that called out all class enemies in just those stark terms. This meant seeing how patriotic bromides often functioned to paper over fundamental conflicts of interest between employers and workers, in ways that perpetuated the fiction of a harmonious “we the people.”

Thus, crucial to such an oppositional culture was a vision of community, not based on race, gender, or nationality, but on treating workers or colonized peoples abroad—regardless of their ethnicity or citizenship—as engaged in the same freedom struggles over economic and political self-determination. IWW pamphleteers commonly maintained that their movement was “an international movement; not merely an American movement. We are ‘patriotic’ for our class, the working class.” One pamphleteer articulated a reason labor should oppose entrance into World War I, “As long as we quarrel among ourselves over differences of nationality we weaken our cause, we defeat our own purpose.”5

Reform victories at home—winning the eight-hour day or the right to strike, for example—would also provide strength to workers abroad fighting the same corporate entities. Journals such as the International Socialist Review devoted extensive space to the fate of labor activism around the world—often following events in Mexico or Japan with the same intensity as those closer by. This was both to maintain feelings of shared community and to make clear that events elsewhere that reined in business elites also had material effects on the bargaining position of those same elites within the United States. Such an emphasis was in part due to how central immigrant labor, during these years, became to revitalizing and radicalizing working-class politics. Such workers arrived with their own experiences of political struggle as well as ideas about institutional possibility. And they pushed existing labor groups to see the significance of cross-national class solidarity for any successful anti-capitalist agenda. All of this led to a very specific relationship to the American state. Rather than taking pride in its wars or its growing primacy, emerging labor activists, both native and foreign born, pressed working people to view the state as a partisan opponent shaping the terms of labor struggle through its global choices. For this very reason, labor constituencies had to assert their own independent foreign policy and orientation to the world, an orientation that may well require taking on the state itself.

Labor Internationalism in Decline

Between World War I and the 1950s, labor internationalism faced a series of brutal crackdowns on dissent, marked in the early years by the effective criminalization of the IWW and the imprisonment of many of its members. During the 1920s, this crackdown went hand in hand with a government- and business-led project of patriotic education in schools and in the public square. Such campaigns presented labor activism—and especially the internationalism of groups such as the IWW—as a foreign threat and as fundamentally un-American.

Similar dynamics played out again a generation later in the context of U.S.-Soviet rivalry and state-driven suppression of communist and socialist politics. The ultimate result was that by the 1950s, American labor leaders accepted a basic cold war compromise. This compromise preserved their own hard-won New Deal–era achievements, while leaving to the state the right to direct foreign policy as it saw fit. Over time, more and more labor leaders came to view the compromise not just pragmatically but actually to identify with the state’s cold war project—including its most violent and destructive elements. This was due to a genuine belief among some that the growing national security state in fact facilitated labor’s gains. World War II—and the war economy—had indeed generated real economic growth. The living standards and social status of white unionized workers reached a high point in the 1950s. Moreover, the perceived threat from Nazi Germany and then from the Soviet Union made plausible to many Americans that what the state fought for abroad, in the face of potentially existential threats, protected people at home. Today, these claims sound like empty clichés, but in the early days of the cold war, they spoke to real and deeply felt experiences of intertwined military victories and economic gains.

But even if the New Deal order convinced some labor leaders of the potential compatibility between empire and social democracy, over the long run, the results proved disastrous. To begin with, the alliance of organized labor with the state corroded the movement’s moral standing, as unions made common cause abroad with brutal business elites and U.S.-friendly dictators. Especially through entities like the American Institute for Free Labor Development (AIFLD), voices within organized labor not only defended catastrophic follies such as the Vietnam War but also participated in undermining foreign labor movements, when these movements contradicted the security state’s anti-communist agenda.6 The old IWW fears about the substantive alliances of that security state proved correct. Foreign policy decision making was not driven by working people or their interests but by security experts and corporate elites. It was built around pro-business market goals and continuous military intervention in ways that intruded into the domestic sphere, whether through expensive and disastrous wars or by expanding corporate rights that undermined the global position of labor. Taken together, these polices over time propelled precisely the cycle of conservative retrenchment and privatization that ate away at labor successes in the United States. Rather than preserving social democracy, as cold war labor leaders had hoped, the state’s constitutive ties to business and the enormous growth of the security apparatus underscored the exceptional and precarious nature of past New Deal achievements.

Social Democracy without Empire

Today, one can sketch out what a non-imperial vision of the United States in the world might look like. This vision, not unlike that of labor radicals a century ago, would oppose American international police power—the presumptive right of intervention—and refuse to treat any foreign people as an instrument in the service of state security ends. It would view social democracy rather than free market capitalism (as embodied in austerity, neoliberal privatization, and trade agreements built on entrenching corporate property rights) as the bedrock of global economic relations. Thus, instead of assisting footloose capital in avoiding regulation or paying the taxes it owes, the state would work on the global stage to end tax havens that hide away the money of plutocrats, protect foreign labor from oppression at the hands of U.S. multinationals, and develop collective strategies for controlling corporate power more generally.

Such an approach would also inevitably buttress a meaningful commitment to local self-determination—treating the United States and its officials as rightly limited by binding domestic and international sanctions. This would put into question the terms of current American alliances, alliances such as those in the Middle East with Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Israel that the state has for so long maintained with treasure and force of arms. In the process, the United States would show far greater hesitancy to pursue militarized responses, or to turn a blind eye when its own regional proxies engage in lawlessness and brutal violence. Thus, this vision would reject the absolute impunity, for both state abuse and financial crime, which government officials, corporate elites, and foreign allies have all enjoyed as a presumptive staple of American imperium. And finally, such a reorientation would require a systematic transformation of the national security state, particularly a significant demobilization of its military footprint abroad and its security infrastructure at home. This security apparatus has fed American interventionism and criminalized dissent, and placed immigrant and Muslim communities under constant suspicion.

But at present, any effort to develop progressive “white papers” on foreign policy, in keeping with this overarching vision, faces more than simply an uphill battle. It is not just that the left does not have a policymaking infrastructure to give concrete substance to non-imperial politics. Crucially, if such an infrastructure were somehow to materialize and a future Democratic administration included competing voices—say on what to do in Afghanistan or how to reconstruct American trade deals—it is unclear how much would actually change. This is because even under those circumstances, foreign policy would still be treated as a separate realm of expert-driven decision making, undergirded by a massive business and security-dominated bureaucracy. A social democratic president may have one or two new voices in the room, but all the remaining advice, not to mention the terms of the debate, would still be set by the same old figures and perspectives.

Moreover, without any sustained external pressure, the policy that would emerge would inevitably be what appeared reasonable to those in the room. What made “Medicare for All” so persuasive to Democratic politicians was not that the merits of the idea somehow won over decision makers. Similar calls had been circulating for decades with limited effect. It was that the call was now backed up by organized popular commitment. Similarly, when it comes to foreign policy issues, unless alternative goals have the power of mass democratic pressure, it is hard to imagine that new ideas on their own will miraculously win the day. What past labor radicals understood was that unless an anti-imperial agenda was experienced by labor and other organized constituencies as bread-and-butter matters, and thus actively fought for, it would inevitably fail. Or even worse, elites would use jingoism and nationalist appeals, as has Trump and a virulent right, to protect their interests and to attack working-class solidarities.

Making Material Demands in Internationalist Terms

All of this underscores that for an actual alternative foreign policy to emerge and to be genuinely plausible, it is crucial that left constituencies begin articulating material demands in internationalist terms, not unlike how labor radicals once did. From the vision statement of the Movement for Black Lives to the AFL-CIO’s own recent 2017 convention resolution, titled “War Is Not the Answer,” such an effort has no doubt started to emerge. And indeed, part of the reason why is because, for all of the darkness entailed by the rise of Trump, this moment offers the rare possibility for a left internationalism to return to prominence.

In his own way, Trump’s focus on “America First” as a central way of discussing the economy, with its pro-business protectionism and suspicion of traditional European allies, has chipped away at the separation between the domestic and foreign. And in doing so, it has perhaps opened the door for the left to offer a genuinely emancipatory account of how these two can be differently combined. Moreover, if anti-imperial politics in the past faced harsh state crackdowns, part of the success of that state suppression was due to the reality of world war and of genuine global antagonists. Left forces today will still have to reckon with a militarized brand of hyper-nationalism, one willing to tar any opposition, from kneeling during the playing of the national anthem to questioning the utility of new weapons purchases, as unpatriotic. But the lack of real existential competitors—and the relative weakness of declared American enemies, whether al Qaeda, Iran, or North Korea—undercuts the fear-mongering that in the past was so central to generating broad support for conservative reaction and crackdowns.

Given these partial openings, what is most needed now in reviving left internationalism is a focus on those locations where foreign and domestic connect dramatically and so resonate as matters of everyday material need. One key intersection is over the security budget. The United States accounts for nearly half of all global defense expenditures, with an annual defense outlay in 2017 of almost $800 billion. This is a fundamental misallocation of the public treasure, which sustains a continuous international police power that promotes instability abroad and feeds militaristic chauvinism at home. Actually entrenching social democracy, through universal access to health care, education, housing, a guaranteed job, and other basic rights, requires the funds to pursue it—what antiwar and civil rights activists during the Vietnam era called a “freedom budget.” And the fundamental condition of possibility for such a budget is not only taxing corporations and the wealthy but also pursuing a dramatic decrease in military and intelligence spending.

But more than an issue of misallocated funds, the politics of the budget also speaks to why working people should care about the larger and destructive geostrategic alliances that the U.S. government has maintained. The security budget, which amounts to a massive giveaway to corporations, facilitates both a militarized relationship to the world and, through arms sales and financial assistance, bankrolls the extreme violence of specific regional allies. It underscores the extent to which the security state operates hand in glove with corporate interests and to the direct detriment of local peoples. Thus, so long as left constituencies refuse to have the fight over the budget, the possibility of an actual shift in geostrategy— including in places such as the Middle East— and thus in meaningful foreign policy is essentially off the table.

A second key intersection is over the politics of impunity. When oligarchs like Trump are unaccountable for their financial crimes—from tax fraud to money laundering—and for their labor violations, they enjoy the same freedom from legal sanction that officials who commit torture or human rights abuses do. Both are illustrations of a corrosive political order that works on behalf of plutocracy. Thus, any necessary response entails organizing mass pressure around measures that would address both state violence and financial crime.

It also means exposing the shallowness of Trumpian protectionism. Just because this protectionism flies in the face of Republican trade orthodoxy, and is opposed by some business elites, does not mean that it actually serves working-class interests or is remotely committed to challenging corporate dominance. Indeed, Trumpian tariffs and trade talk not only remain a grab bag of corporate payoffs. They also break class solidarities by repeating the lie that workers are primarily threatened by foreign labor rather by than by the realities of American capitalism and its domestic abettors. A social democratic alternative must be based, at a minimum, on a vision of global trade that imposes real constraints on the transnational property rights of corporations. It must see full employment and a guaranteed jobs program at home as going hand in hand with the final end of business impunity abroad—by enforcing environmental and labor standards, by holding corporations responsible for what happens in their supply chain, and by prosecuting those that violate the law.7

A final intersection concerns immigrant labor and immigrant rights, which in today’s America is essential to class-based political struggle. The overwhelming tendency—and not just on the right—is to present immigration as an issue that begins at the national border, with virtually no attention paid to the particular histories, international economic pressures, and specific U.S. foreign policy practices that generate migration patterns in the first place. The movement of men and women from their homes does not occur in a vacuum and is deeply tied not only to a colonial past stitching together the Global North and the Global South but also to business-led and state-backed policies. These policies, along with being complicit in local violence, promote corporate control and worker insecurity abroad. Indeed, the main drivers of mass dispossession and hence mass immigration in the Global South are the fundamental and structuring relations of economic exploitation and political domination between the West and the rest of the world.

Any effort to strengthen the hand of labor— along with linking the domestic and the foreign—requires a sustained effort to confront this fact, beginning with the provision of real economic and political rights to migrants here in the United States. To the extent that harsh border practices are today a continuous source of legally sanctioned terror, sowing fear and reducing immigrant workers to silence, these practices too have to be fundamentally uprooted. If Trump has linked the foreign and domestic through racial demonization and a focus on the imperative of the border, the challenge for the left is precisely to invert and repudiate his framing. The goal must be to reject absolutely that imperative, and to present the full protection of immigrant status as a paramount objective of labor struggle itself—a necessary element of improving the power of the working class. And moreover, this politics must take its lead from immigrant workers themselves. Just as a century ago, these workers come with their own grounding in political struggle. They have been essential to infusing labor agendas with new energy and moral commitment as well as, given their experiences, to highlighting the constitutive ties between anti-imperialism and economic freedom.

A left foreign policy cannot emerge in a vacuum. It will require an intellectual infrastructure premised on non-imperial values and armed with actual substantive knowledge about how to transition to a more equitable and democratic global condition. But above all, it will also require an organized and assertive politics within the United States that sees the domestic in international terms—something that for decades has been missing. In a sense, if the Sanders wing of the Democratic Party has reshaped the domestic reform debate over what is possible, for these goals to succeed and to stick, a second transformation will likely have to take place. Such a transformation must connect, in everyday politics, social democracy to anti-imperialism—seeing each as impossible without the support of the other.

#### Radical engagements with legal structures like the aff are key to breaking down harmful structures of gender

Faithful 10 – folk healing artist and healing justice practitioner rooted in the African diasporic tradition of conjure and former lawyer with a JD from American University Washington College of Law.

Richael Faithful, “(Law) Breaking Gender: In Search of Transformative Gender Law,” *Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law*, 2010, https://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1490&context=jgspl

Andrew Gilden’s article envisions a system in which “legal rules may potentially counter such traditions by eliminating their means of perpetuation while simultaneously laying the foundations for a future that embraces a broad range of gendered expression.”47 To do this, he suggests that advocates must make a “conceptual shift” so that the law may reinforce more positive gender norms.48 Gilden then proposes a comparison to other gender-fluid systems to guide the Western “legal reconstructive project.”49 I hope that my previous points on criminalization reinforce his core arguments; however, I wish to redirect his conclusion that we are doomed until we change cultural norms around gender.

First, vigorous client advocacy and anti-essentialism50 advocacy are not mutually exclusive work. Brilliant litigators consistently advance client and community interests, although, admittedly, it is extremely difficult to do. It is a strategy in which inexperienced advocates should not necessarily engage.51 Gilden seems to argue that any “non-progressive” advocacy (advocacy that does not challenge gendered assumptions) is harmful because it reinforces the current legal regime. He categorically rejects such a “short-term strategy” that further entrenches gender norms.52 I qualify his point to mean this: we should encourage experienced advocates to engage in creative, effective, progressive lawyering that advances client and community interests. I defer to skilled practitioners for specific thoughts on this issue. Activists, in the meantime, can employ new law-making strategies.

Second, formal equality critiques that condemn any “non-progressive” approaches are not very helpful. Politics is not a zero-sum game. In other words, shaping our current reality does not resign us to the status quo; rather, it can offer wisdom to be used toward our present strategy as we fulfill our transformative vision. I urge gender-justice supporters not to shy away from post-identity critiques because alternatives seem unpalatable— alternatives, after all, should seem like a stretch. Instead, we should view critiques as insights into our possible future. So, where do we go from here?

Martha Fineman’s vulnerability thesis is a useful framework for the transformative gender law discussion.53 The vulnerability thesis envisions the development of political and legal institutions on a “comprehensive vision of the human experience.”54 Fineman argues that vulnerability is a variable condition based on human realities and that societal institutions, designed to “lessen[,] . . . ameliorate[,] . . . and compensate . . . for vulnerability,” should be responsive to these realities.55 Most convincing about Fineman’s work is its implicit anticipation that international models will finally penetrate United States jurisprudence.56 Her model predicts and utilizes constructive cultural and legal trends.

A positive, nexus-based civil rights model diverges from a formal equality model in three important ways. First, it assumes gender difference rather than gender conformity. The absence of a gender imperative necessarily diminishes its regulation. Second, a vulnerability model reverses the long-standing presumption that all discrimination is benign unless proven otherwise. Such a presumption for a state protection is consistent with a vulnerability thesis, and it is reasonable in light of the Fourteenth Amendment.57 Third, a nexus-based civil rights model shifts the discriminatory landscape from one that is dominated by a state intervener to one that includes a state protector. A state protector obligation provides a venue in which systemic oppression of all kinds can be seriously challenged, rather than ignored by the law. Change is inevitable, a new model is necessary, and the vulnerability model holds distinct promise.

A positive, nexus-based model is also more likely to be responsive to gender criminalization. Ancillary criminalization is constitutionally suspect due to its disparate impact on gender variant people. Systemic criminalization is interrupted as the government adopts a protector obligation and provides more robust safety nets. More universalized healthcare, for instance, is a safety net that would immensely benefit marginalized gender variant people on the whole. Equally important, a more responsive legal regime opens the floodgates of accountability from lawmakers to police. Decision-makers will be on notice that their behavior will be scrutinized if it deviates from fundamental nexus principles. A new model cannot eliminate discrimination or its deeply-rooted systemic effects, but it can ameliorate a political climate that has tolerated it for far too long.

The equal protection model and vulnerability model fail, however, if the general discrimination argument is lost. The success of any model is contingent on justice-minded people creating conditions in which not only is all discrimination suspect, but all discrimination is not treated the same under the law. The simple fact is that denying a job to a gender variant person because ze58 “doesn’t look right” is distinct from denying a gendernormative person the same job because ze is the least preferred candidate. Donald Lively and Stephen Plass contend that the formal equality regime is the result of competing governing values, not the result of a desire to end discrimination.59 If we were to settle the values debate and re-orient equal protection toward justice rather than sameness, we would have an opportunity to address marginalization at its core.60

# 1AR

## Case

#### Impact should be framed through reducing risk - complete climate certainty is impossible and cuts both ways – possibility exists we reach eight-degree warming by mid-century due to fat-tail risk

Ramanathan et al. 17

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Climate change projections are quantifed on their likelihoods of occurrence. Our understanding of the climate system is more refned in some areas than in others, but this does not detract from the overall assessments and projections for future changes to the climate. Climate models will continue to improve their treatment of many physical, dynamical, and chemical processes, particularly those dealing with clouds, aerosols, ice sheet dynamics, and the carbon cycle. But the complexity and interconnectedness of climate and human systems means that humanity will never fully dispel all uncertainties about the exact rate, magnitude, or implications of the changes we are affecting on our world through climate change.

Despite these uncertainties, the observed changes in our climate system and the ability of the climate models to simulate these changes and even predict the changes in many instances give us more than enough certainty to act. As warned by a team of retired admirals and generals from the U.S. in a report on climate change:

“Speaking as a soldier, we never have 100 percent certainty. If you wait until you have 100 percent certainty, something bad is going to happen on the battlefield.” (CNA, 2014)

However, the uncertainties cut both ways, and there is one type of climate uncertainly that should inspire us to act with incredible urgency: the uncertainty of the “fat tail.” The feedbacks mentioned in the above section, and others not discussed here, give rise to a wide spread probability distribution of warming for a given forcing from increased CO2 and other climate pollutants. For example, a doubling of CO2 has a projected central value of warming of 3°C (IPCC, 2013). The 90% probability distribution, however, includes warming as low as 2°C and as large as 4.5°C. On the lower side, there is a less than 1% chance that the warming seen under a doubling of CO2 will be less than 1.5°C. However, on the upper limit, there is a 1% to 5% probability the warming could be as large as 6°C to 8ºC (Figure 3) (Ramanathan and Feng, 2008). Such low probability and high-risk probability distribution is referred to as “fat tail” (Weitzman, 2011). Warming magnitudes of 6°C or more would pose an existential threat to most of the global population and expose nearly 90% of the species to extinction (Mora et al., 2017; Barnosky, 2014).

In the context of warming and greenhouse gases, the “fat tail” indicates there exists a larger range of possible temperatures far warmer than 2°C compared to the range of possible temperatures cooler than 2°C. With each incremental increase in temperature, this central value gets shifted farther towards the warmer temperature range, and with it the “fat tail” shifts in the same manner, which means that even greater temperatures exist within the realm of possibility, even if it is a small chance.

Put in perspective, how many people would choose to buckle into an airplane seat if they knew there was as much as a 1 in 20 chance, or even a 1 in 100 chance, of the plane crashing? Most of us would undoubtedly stay home. The calculated odds of dying in a plane crash are closer to 1 in 11 million, which is why it is such a popular and safe form of transportation. If a 1 in 100 chance of dying in a plane crash would be enough to end air travel shouldn’t it also be enough to end the use of fossil fuels and slow climate change?

#### Apoc rhet key to respond to environmental destruction – their exclusive focus dismisses action and redeployment solves cooption

Schatz, PhD candidate in English – SUNY Binghamton, ‘12

(J.L., “The Importance of Apocalypse: The Value of End-Of The-World Politics While Advancing Ecocriticism,” Journal of Ecocriticism 4(2) July)

It is no longer a question that human interaction with the world is destroying the very ecosystems that sustain life1. Nevertheless, within academic communities people are divided over which discursive tactic, ontological position, or strategy for activism should be adopted. I contend that regardless of an ecocritic’s particular orientation that ecocriticism most effectively produces change when it doesn’t neglect the tangible reality that surrounds any discussion of the environment. This demands including human-induced ecocidal violence within all our accounts. Retreating from images of ecological collapse to speak purely within inner-academic or policymaking circles isolates our conversations away from the rest of the world—as it dies before our eyes.

This is not to argue that interrogating people’s discourse, tactics, ontological orientation, or anything else lacks merit. Timothy Luke, Chair and Distinguished Professor of Political Science at the Virginia Polytechnic Institute, explains that

Because nothing in Nature simply is given within society, such terms must be assigned sig- nificance by every social group that mobilizes them[.] ... Many styles of ecologically grounded criticism circulate in present-day American mass culture, partisan debate, consumer society, academic discourse, and electoral politics as episodes of ecocritique, contesting our politics of nature, economy, and culture in the contemporary global system of capitalist production and consumption. (1997: xi)

Luke reminds us that regardless of how ecocritics advance their agenda they always impact our environmental awareness and therefore alter our surrounding ecology. In doing so he shows that both literal governmental policies and the symbolic universe they take place within reconstruct the discourses utilized to justify policy and criticism in the first place. This is why films like The Day After Tomorrow and 2012 can put forth realistic depictions of government response to environmental apocalypse. And despite being fictional, these films in turn can influence the reality of governmental policy. Even the science-fiction of weather-controlling weapons are now only steps away from becoming reality2.

Oftentimes it takes images of planetary annihilation to motivate people into action after years of sitting idly by watching things slowly decay. In reality it takes awareness of impending disaster to compel policymakers to enact even piecemeal reform. On the screen it takes the actual appearance of ecological apocalypse to set the plot in motion. What is constant is that “as these debates unfold, visions of what is the good or bad life ... find many of their most compelling articulations as ecocritiques ... [that are] mobilized for and against various projects of power and economy in the organization of our everyday existence” (Luke 1997: xi). We cannot motivate people to change the ecological conditions that give rise to thoughts of theorization without reference to the concrete environmental destruction ongoing in reality. This means that, even when our images of apocalypse aren’t fully accurate, our use of elements of scientifically-established reality reconstructs the surrounding power structures in beneficial ways. When we ignore either ecological metaphors or environmental reality we only get part of the picture.`

In recent years, many ecocritics have shied away from the very metaphors that compel a sense of urgency. They have largely done so out of the fear that its deployment will get co-opted by hegemonic institutions. Such critics ignore how what we advocate alters our understanding of ourselves to the surrounding ecology. In doing so, our advocacies render such co-optation meaningless because of the possibility to redeploy our metaphors in the future. In the upcoming sections, I will provide an overview of how poststructuralist thinkers like Michel Foucault and Martin Heidegger influence some ecocritics to retreat from omnicidal rhetoric. This retreat minimizes the main objectives of their ecocriticism. I argue that rather than withdrawing from images of apocalypse that we should utilize them in subversive ways to disrupt the current relationship people have to their ecology. Professor of Sociology at York University, Fuyuki Kurasawa argues that “instead of bemoaning the contemporary preeminence of a dystopian imaginary ... it can enable a novel form of transnational socio-political action ... that can be termed preventive foresight. ... [I]t is a mode of ethico-political practice enacted by participants in the emerging realm of global civil society ... [by] putting into practice a sense of responsibility for the future by attempting to prevent global catastrophes” (454-455).

By understanding how metaphors around the environment operate we can better utilize discourse to steer us away from the brink of apocalypse. The alternative of abandoning apocalyptic deployments is far worse. Put simply, “by minimizing the urgency or gravity of potential threats, procrastination appears legitimate” (Kurasawa 462). In the final section of my essay, I outline how ecocritics can utilize images of omnicide to motivate the evolution of successful tactics that can slow the pace of environmental destruction.

#### Public is easily engaged – their data’s flawed by bad poll design

Romm 11 (Joe Romm is a Fellow at American Progress and is the editor of Climate Progress, which New York Times columnist Tom Friedman called "the indispensable blog" and Time magazine named one of the 25 “Best Blogs of 2010.″ In 2009, Rolling Stone put Romm #88 on its list of 100 “people who are reinventing America.” Time named him a “Hero of the Environment″ and “The Web’s most influential climate-change blogger.” Romm was acting assistant secretary of energy for energy efficiency and renewable energy in 1997, where he oversaw $1 billion in R&D, demonstration, and deployment of low-carbon technology. He is a Senior Fellow at American Progress and holds a Ph.D. in physics from MIT., “Exclusive Bombshell: Experts Debunk Polls that Claim Sharp Drop in Number of Americans Who Believe in Global Warming”, 11/15/2011, http://thinkprogress.org/romm/2011/11/15/360335/experts-debunk-polls-americans-believe-in-global-warming/#jump)

Politicians and pundits and the public have all been told by the media and others that public belief in global warming has dropped sharply. Except that it hasn’t, as polling by Stanford and Ipsos and Reuters make clear. Yes, other polls, notably by Gallup and Pew, do seem to seem to show a sharp drop. But in exclusive interviews with Climate Progress, two leading experts on climate, public opinion and media coverage — Jon Krosnick and Max Boykoff — explain what’s really going on. The big apparent drop in some polls is almost certainly due to the combination of the collapse in media coverage of global warming and pollsters asking a deeply flawed question. How is that possible? Well, let’s look at a typical media spin on the subject, “Where Did Global Warming Go?” by Elisabeth Rosenthal in The New York Times last month: Across the nation, too, belief in man-made global warming, and passion about doing something to arrest climate change, is not what it was five years or so ago, when Al Gore’s movie had buzz and Elizabeth Kolbert’s book about climate change, “Field Notes From a Catastrophe,” was a best seller. The number of Americans who believe the earth is warming dropped to 59 percent last year from 79 percent in 2006, according to polling by the Pew Research Group. Hmm. That’s a pretty big drop — except the Pew Research group doesn’t actually ask people whether they believe the earth is warming! Unfortunately, Pew asks people “From what you’ve read and heard, is there solid evidence that the average temperature on earth has been getting warmer over the past few decades, or not?” Instead of asking people what they believe or think, Pew asks them what they’ve read or heard. Both Krosnick and Boykoff make a strong case that this rather fatally taints the whole question, especially since media coverage — which represents much if not most of what the public reads or hears on climate change — collapsed in 2010. Boykoff has an excellent new book, Who Speaks for the Climate? Making Sense of Media Reporting on Climate Change, which you can buy here. He discusses this specific subject in a must-read section titled, “Polling and public sentiment.” I’ve long been a fan of Boykoff’s work and interviewed him last week. It was his research (among others) that documented the recent media collapse in climate coverage in this stunning chart: US Media Coverage There is a brief spike in late 2009 around Copenhagen (and Climategate), but media coverage has crashed back to 2005 levels. You can see the same effect in the TV coverage (see Silence of the Lambs: Media herd’s coverage of climate change “fell off the map” in 2010): So it’s no big surprise that asking people climate questions based on “what you’ve read and heard” will lead to a sharp drop from levels when people read or heard much more about global warming. Boykoff told me that he agreed with Krosnick that people’s underlying beliefs about climate change were “generally stable.” As he put it: If the media is suffocating an issue, it can fall out of the public mind and policy agenda. Boykoff is not a fan in the least bit of either poorly worded polls or media coverage of such polls, as he makes clear in his book: Unless there is a global plebiscite or referendum on whether the climate is changing, such questions are at best distracting and at worst destructive to work that seeks to enhance public understanding and consistent, measured consideration of the range of climate policy alternatives…. In this way, mass media do damage by reducing issues of risk and expert-based scientific understanding to that of mere opinion. I also had a long discussion with Stanford’s Krosnick. He has written entire journal articles about the importance of question wording and about the specific influence of introductory clauses on the outcome of polls. The short version is, as he explained to me, that words matter and people answer the question they are asked. People’s underlying beliefs are pretty stable, as his polling shows (with the exception of a segment of the conservative population, but that’s another blog post). If you want the long version, he gave a 25-minute talk at the American Meteorological Society on this specific topic that you can watch here (it can take a while to load). Krosnick told me that there’s no sign of shrinkage of the “issue public” — the 15% or so of the public that is highly concerned about climate change, that donates and votes based on the issue. Krosnick has done a great deal of public opinion analysis in this area that shows ongoing, strong support for action on climate change among the public — see Bombshell: Democrats Taking “Green” Positions on Climate Change “Won Much More Often” Than Those Remaining Silent. He analyzed the 2008 presidential election and the 2010 congressional election and explained in an email: Our research suggests that it would be wise for the President and for all other elected officials who believe that climate change is a problem and merits government attention to say this publicly and vigorously, because most Americans share these views. Expressing and pursuing green goals on climate change will gain votes on election day and seem likely to increase the President’s and the Congress’s approval ratings. Of course, team Obama — and a remarkable number of progressives and pundits — have bought into the nonsensical and ultimately self-destructive view that climate change is not a winning issue politically (see “Can you solve global warming without talking about global warming?). It now seems clear that some of the reason for that mistaken view is flawed polling and equally flawed media coverage. Indeed, we have this absurd circularity where media coverage of global warming drops, flawed polls suggest the public’s belief in global warming has dropped, and that, of course, discourages the media (and politicians) from focusing on the issue. That would seem to be yet another worrisome climate feedback.

## K

#### Counter-revolutionaries would splinter the resistance

**Wainer and Bienenfeld 19** – Kit Wainer is a member of the United Federation of Teachers and is active in the opposition caucus, the Movement of Rank and File Educators. Mel Bienenfeld is a longtime socialist activist and recently retired president of a higher-education teachers local union.

(Kate Griffiths, 7-21-2019, "Problems with an Electoral Road to Socialism in the United States," New Politics, https://newpol.org/issue\_post/problems-with-an-electoral-road-to-socialism-in-the-united-states/)

Any program of democratizing the existing state would of necessity involve purging its bureaucracies. Such a move would not be perceived as—and in actuality would not be—a mere replacement of one group of officials by another. It would entail a fierce battle on all fronts—in the courts and in the streets. Its success would not be achievable via the actions of the workers’ legislature or executive alone.

Further, the historical conditions we are discussing will involve the need for immediate solutions to critical problems. Workers will expect their government to encroach widely on capitalist property rights in order to produce meaningful reforms. They will need to check the power of the repressive apparatus mobilized against them and begin taking the measures necessary to pull society out of the depths of its crisis. Then they will have to impose their own repressive force against the capitalists and other counter-revolutionaries fighting to prevent the success of the revolution and overturn its gains.

It is likely that institutions like workers councils will arise in a period of intense struggle. Among the roles they will play will be to defend workers’ social movements against the force of the state and to defend democratic rights. Blanc suggests, reasonably, that workers may need to defend an elected government against a coup. Yet, this alone would be a revolutionary step and likely provoke violent reaction. A parliamentary regime presiding over the current constitutional order would not be in a position to continue the revolution. For better or worse, only if and when workers councils are able to cohere a force with both the physical power and firm intent to break through legal and constitutional limits in order to complete the revolution can the transition to socialism be carried out.

#### State key to solve BOTH warming AND structural oppression

Monbiot 8 – Political & environmental activist, recipient of the UN Global 500 Award for outstanding environmental achievement, author of several award-winning books on environmental crises and corporate capture in politics, reporter for The Guardian Neoliberalism.

George Monbiot, August 22 2008, “Climate change is not anarchy's football,” The Guardian, https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2008/aug/22/climatechange.kingsnorthclimatecamp

If you want a glimpse of how the movement against climate change could crumble faster than a summer snowflake, read Ewa Jasiewicz's article, published yesterday on Comment is free. It is a fine example of the identity politics that plagued direct action movements during the 1990s, and from which the new generation of activists has so far been mercifully free.

Jasiewicz rightly celebrates the leaderless, autonomous model of organising that has made this movement so effective. The two climate camps I have attended – this year and last – were among the most inspiring events I've ever witnessed. I am awed by the people who organised them, who managed to create, under extraordinary pressure, safe, functioning, delightful spaces in which we could debate the issues and plan the actions which thrust Heathrow and Kingsnorth into the public eye. Climate camp is a tribute to the anarchist politics that Jasiewicz supports.

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But in seeking to extrapolate from this experience to a wider social plan, she makes two grave errors. The first is to confuse ends and means. She claims to want to stop global warming, but she makes that task 100 times harder by rejecting all state and corporate solutions. It seems to me that what she really wants to do is to create an anarchist utopia, and to use climate change as an excuse to engineer it.

Stopping runaway climate change must take precedence over every other aim. Everyone in this movement knows that there is very little time: the window of opportunity in which we can prevent two degrees of warming is closing fast. We have to use all the resources we can lay hands on, and these must include both governments and corporations. Or perhaps she intends to build the installations required to turn the energy economy around – wind farms, wave machines, solar thermal plants in the Sahara, new grid connections and public transport systems – herself?

Her article is a terrifying example of the ability some people have to put politics first and facts second when confronting the greatest challenge humanity now faces. The facts are as follows. Runaway climate change is bearing down on us fast. We require a massive political and economic response to prevent it. Governments and corporations, whether we like it or not, currently control both money and power. Unless we manage to mobilise them, we stand a snowball's chance in climate hell of stopping the collapse of the biosphere. Jasiewicz would ignore all these inconvenient truths because they conflict with her politics.

"Changing our sources of energy without changing our sources of economic and political power", she asserts, "will not make a difference. Neither coal nor nuclear are the 'solution', we need a revolution." So before we are allowed to begin cutting greenhouse gas emissions, we must first overthrow all governments and corporations and replace them with autonomous communities of happy campers. All this must take place within a couple of months, as there is so little time in which we could prevent two degrees of warming. This is magical thinking of the most desperate kind. If I were an executive of E.ON or Exxon, I would be delighted by this political posturing, as it provides a marvellous distraction from our real aims.

To support her argument, Jasiewicz misrepresents what I said at climate camp. She claims that I "confessed not knowing where to turn next to solve the issues of how to generate the changes necessary to shift our sources of energy, production and consumption". I confessed nothing of the kind. In my book Heat, I spell out what is required to bring about a 90% cut in emissions by 2030. Instead I confessed that I don't know how to solve the problem of capitalism without resorting to totalitarianism.

The issue is that capitalism involves lending money at interest. If you lend at 5%, then one of two things must happen. Either the money supply must increase by 5%, or the velocity of circulation must increase by 5%. In either case, if this growth is not met by a concomitant increase in the supply of goods and services, it becomes inflationary and the system collapses. But a perpetual increase in the supply of goods and services will eventually destroy the biosphere. So how do we stall this process? Even when usurers were put to death and condemned to perpetual damnation, the practice couldn't be stamped out. Only the communist states managed it, through the extreme use of the state control Jasiewicz professes to hate. I don't yet have an answer to this conundrum. Does she?

Yes, let us fight both corporate power and the undemocratic tendencies of the state. Yes, let us try to crack the problem of capitalism and then fight for a different system. But let us not confuse this task with the immediate need to stop two degrees of warming, or allow it to interfere with the carbon cuts that have to begin now.

Jasiewicz's second grave error is to imagine that society could be turned into a giant climate camp. Anarchism is a great means of organising a self-elected community of like-minded people. It is a disastrous means of organising a planet. Most anarchists envisage their system as the means by which the oppressed can free themselves from persecution. But if everyone is to be free from the coercive power of the state, this must apply to the oppressors as well as the oppressed. The richest and most powerful communities on earth – be they geographical communities or communities of interest – will be as unrestrained by external forces as the poorest and weakest. As a friend of mine put it, "when the anarchist utopia arrives, the first thing that will happen is that every Daily Mail reader in the country will pick up a gun and go and kill the nearest hippy".